Retail inventory is a closely watched statistic by retailers as well as their investors, lenders and suppliers.
Introduction
Retailers often face a dilemma in deciding how much inventory to carry on their balance sheets. Among compelling reasons for increasing inventory levels despite the costs associated with additional inventory are to provide greater product variety and achieve higher fill rates. But these benefits to customers often represent a source of concern to others, such as equity investors and lenders, who tend to view rapid inventory growth like the canary in the coal mine, as a harbinger of trouble. Of particular importance to lenders is that inventory growth increases a retailer's risk of bankruptcy. Even relatively small increases in inventory level or modest reductions in sales can substantially diminish a retailer's cash flow.
To help them better manage inventory, retailers have invested in organizations (e.g., in departments called buying, merchandising, and merchandise planning) as well as in a variety of technological tools. But determining optimal inventory level, as textbooks in operations research have long noted, can be complicated. Optimal inventory level is affected by numerous variables including a product's expected demand, demand uncertainty, gross margins, obsolescence and inventory carrying costs, lead-time for replenishment, and periodicity of review.
Managing retail inventory has become more complicated during the past few decades. Witness department store markdowns, which grew from 7% in the 1970s to more than 20% by the late 1990s, i surveys that find stockouts rampant in most retail formats, and, for the industry as a whole, ii inventory turns that have not increased substantially despite massive investments in technology.
Among many reasons for the increased complexity of retail inventory management is an explosion in product variety in most product categories. In men's apparel, for example, the market share for white shirts has declined substantially iii . Concurrently, product lifecycles have shrunk in many categories. This is perhaps easiest to see in the context of certain technological products, for which the rate of innovation is so high that products in inventory lose value at 1% per week. The per chip cost of memory (RAM), for example, declined from $16 in 2000 to $4 only a dozen years later, even as storage capacity increased by 1,000 times. In other words, the per-unit cost of storage plummeted by 4,000 times over a 12-year period.
Increased variety and shorter lifecycles have made it more difficult to forecast demand for products. As we have shown in prior research, greater variety has also resulted in a variety of execution problems at the store level (inventory records, for example, become less accurate as inventory level goes up), and retail consolidation has complicated the task of tracking sales at the individual store and SKU level and stocking accordingly (the typical buyer might now be responsible for planning inventory for hundreds of SKUs at thousands of locations). With the growth of alternate channels (e.g., the Web), often with their own rules governing pricing, taxes, and returns, retailers have been faced with the need to balance inventory across channels. The longer lead times often associated with the search for production sources with cheaper labor costs in many categories has further complicated inventory planning iv .
Due to these complexities, retailers must pay closer attention to inventory, and their investors and lenders use inventory as an indicator of quality of management.
The Investor Perspective
Equity investors, although they care about retail inventory for the very same reasons retailers do, also worry that growth in inventory might conceal weaknesses in a retailer's ability to generate future sales and earnings. In other words, investors view inventory as the proverbial canary in the coal mine. Savvy professional investors we interviewed routinely track whether inventory growth exceeds sales growth, and challenge management to offer an explanation when it does.
Inventory affects future stock returns of retailers. In scenario B, in which the retailer values the leftover inventory at cost (i.e., at $4), the cost of sales drops to $6 (from $10) and the gross margin increases to $6 (from $2) and 50% (from 17%) of revenue. The retailer has overstated its gross margins in the current year by overvaluing its inventory, but future earnings will be depressed because the retailer will likely have to write off the excess inventory at some future date.
The foregoing example probably exaggerates retailer discretion relative to inventory valuation. It would be difficult for a retailer to value its entire obsolete inventory at cost, and such inventory might not be entirely worthless (i.e., it may have some residual value). Yet most observers to whom we have spoken judge retailers to enjoy considerable discretion in the value they assign to inventory. According to retailer's products. Moreover, there are limits to the extent to which sales growth can be driven by inventory. Sales growth generated by increases in inventory levels, because it does not predict future sales growth, should thus not be rewarded as handsomely as sales growth generated by heightened consumer demand.
The Lender and Supplier Perspectives
Lenders and suppliers attend to inventory levels because growth can often predict future cash-flow problems and, in some cases, bankruptcy and liquidation. In the event of liquidation, inventory is often the primary vehicle by which lenders recover money from retailers.
To understand the relationship between inventory growth and cash flow, consider a retailer with annual sales of $100 that turns its inventory twice per year. Assume, quite reasonably, that gross margin is 50% and net profit 4% of sales (or $4, currently). In other words, fixed costs are $46 per year. Ignoring, for simplicity, taxes and non-cash expenses, the retailer's cash flow will be $4. Inventory, which turns twice per year, at half the cost of sales, is valued at $25.
Anticipating 20% growth in aggregate sales in the subsequent year, the retailer increases its inventory by 20% over the previous year, to $30. What will happen to the retailer's cash flow if gross margin and fixed cost remain at the previous year's level, but the anticipated sales growth does not materialize, in other words, if sales match the previous year's level?
Assume, conservatively, that the extra inventory carried by the retailer does not lose value (i.e.,
can be valued at cost). (It will, of course, incur some inventory carrying cost, which we ignore for convenience.) In this case, the retailer's profit will remain unchanged, at $4, but its cash flow will be -$1 as opposed to $4 in the previous year. This adverse impact of carrying excess inventory would be exacerbated if the additional inventory increased the obsolescence cost or we were to explicitly incorporate inventory carrying cost in our example. Lenders also pay close attention to the quality of inventory. Both quality and quantity of inventory largely determine the extent to which lenders are able to recover loans made to retailers that run into cash flow problems and are forced to liquidate. In many recent retail liquidations, banks with substantial loans have managed to recover all the money due them.
So what is the appropriate level of inventory for a retailer?
Retailers and external stakeholders need a benchmarking tool that can be used to determine appropriate levels of inventory. It is important that such a benchmark be derived from publicly available data so that the metric can be calculated as easily by equity investors and other external stakeholders as by managers.
The metrics most commonly used, not just by retailers, but much more widely, to assess inventory productivity have been inventory turns and the algebraic equivalent, days of inventory. That they are easily calculated and understood, and rely only on data available as well to external stakeholders through public financial statements, probably explains the longevity and popularity of these two metrics.
Inventory turns, however, is a generally coarse metric against which to benchmark inventory productivity. We explain below the challenges associated with using inventory turns as a benchmark, and develop an alternative, which we term Adjusted Inventory Turns. We then illustrate by means of a few examples the different insights that can be gleaned from inventory turns and adjusted inventory turns.
An overarching challenge to its use as a benchmark is that inventory turns varies widely across retailers, and even over time for a given retailer. For example, is it reasonable to conclude that because grocery chain Kroger (NYSE: KR) turned its inventory 14 times and apparel retailer Gap (NYSE: GPS)
5.7 times in 2011 that the former better managed its inventory? Even among retailers within the same segment inventory turns can vary widely, as evidenced, within the consumer electronics segment, by Best Buy (NYSE: BBY), which turns its inventory over six times, and Radio Shack Corporation (NYSE: RSH), which turns its inventory over fewer than four times, per year. Here, too, it would be wrong to conclude, based on inventory turns alone, that Best Buy is doing a better job than Radio Shack at managing its inventory. Even a given retailer can experience substantial variation, as evidenced, for example, by inventory turns at Family Dollar Stores (NYSE: FDO), which, over the two decades that spanned 1990-2010, fluctuated between 2.2 and 4.9 times per year.
What explains such variation in inventory turns? Our past research vi has identified multiple drivers. We simplify the analysis in those papers to focus on the two drivers we have found to be most salient, gross margins and capital intensity.
Ceteris paribus, an increase in gross margin should be associated with a decrease in inventory turnover, and vice versa. There are several reasons to expect this negative correlation between inventory turnover and gross margin. An increase in gross margin is associated with improved service levels, increased variety, a shift towards higher quality, slower moving products, or a reduction in markdowns.
With each such change, inventory turnover generally decreases. Indeed, retailers often recognize an "earns versus turns tradeoff," whereby, in order to be profitable, a high gross margin must be earned on each sale or inventory turned very fast. Retailers with low earns and low turns would be under pressure to improve their operations or eventually shut down. Retailers with high earns and high turns tend to be rare because of the difficulty of sustaining this advantage over a long period of time in a competitive marketplace.
Capital intensity, defined as the ratio of capital assets to total assets + capitalized leases, should be positively correlated with inventory turnover. Decisions that lead to an increase in capital intensity include setting up warehouses and investing in supply chain infrastructure and logistics. Such decisions should lead to an increase in inventory turnover by making it possible to use inventory more productively.
Note that increasing numbers of stores will not increase capital intensity because both inventory and fixed assets will increase proportionately. If, however, stores were made more efficient through redesign and reformatting, capital intensity and inventory turnover would be expected to increase.
We define adjusted inventory turns for firm i in year t in terms of the following formula: * 1 . *
. alternatively stated as, (The appendix provides a technical description of our procedure.)
AIT is similar in concept to a commonly used performance metric termed as gross margin return on inventory (GMROI), which is defined as the gross margin earned per dollar invested in a firm's inventory, and measured as the ratio of gross margin to inventory. Although it controls for the correlation of inventory turnover with gross margin, GMROI assumes that a 1% increase in gross margin must be compensated by a 1% decrease in inventory turnover. Such a fixed relationship does not have an economic basis and does not exist in practice. Moreover, GMROI does not adjust for the correlation of inventory turnover with capital intensity. AIT overcomes these drawbacks as it is derived from historical data on retailer performance.
To illustrate how inventory turns and adjusted inventory turns can offer different insights, we evaluate, using both metrics, the performance of two well-known retailers, Wal-Mart (NYSE: WMT) and Target (NYSE: TGT), over the years that spanned . Figure 2a shows the change in inventory turns for both firms during this period. As shown in the figure, Wal-Mart's inventory turns grew steadily, from fewer than four to nearly eight turns per year. Stated alternatively, the company went from carrying roughly 90 days to carrying roughly 45 days of inventory. Target's inventory turns during the period changed less, rising from 4.5 to 6. Looking at that metric alone would suggest that during this period inventory management was improved substantially more by Wal-Mart than by Target. Now compare how adjusted inventory turns evolved at each of these firms during this period.
Both increased their adjusted inventory turns substantially, from around 11 in 1985 to roughly 16 in 2007.
It is hard from the data to say if either firm outperformed the other on AIT during the entire period under discussion; a numerical count reveals that Wal-Mart's AIT exceeded Target's AIT for 11 of the 23 years that are represented in the figure 2b. Looking at adjusted inventory turns would lead us to conclude that there was essentially no difference in the firms' inventory productivity.
Why do the insights derived from inventory turns and adjusted inventory turns differ so? It is useful to examine the 22-year period in three phases: 1985 -1995 1996 -2002 -2007 . During 1985 -1995 , both firms' inventory turns held reasonably steady; Target's inventory turns exceeded Wal-Mart's during the period but AIT was similar for the two firms. Why were inventory turns at Target higher than at Wal-Mart even though AIT was roughly tied at the two firms? During this period Wal-Mart's capital intensity was usually lower than Target's. In 1985 for example, capital intensity was roughly 60% at WalMart, and roughly 70% at Target. In other words, capital assets accounted for 60% of Wal-Mart's total assets and 70% of Target's total assets. Adjusted inventory turnover thus provides, by adjusting, on the basis of a statistical model, changes in inventory turnover to reflect simultaneous changes in gross margin and capital intensity, a method of benchmarking inventory productivity. This gives us a metric that supports comparisons, whether across firms in a retail segment or within a given firm over time.
What can be gleaned from a retailer's adjusted inventory turns?
Is AIT a useful benchmark managerially, that is, is it a reliable indicator of changes in performance? Our research having shown this metric to be effective at gauging sales, earnings, and stock price, we suggest that managers, investors, and lenders ignore it at their peril.
Does AIT predict sales and earnings?
In a word, yes. We preface with our findings in this regard a deeper discussion of the details of our methodology.
Our analysis of this phenomenon begins with an examination of the bias in analyst forecasts for over-and under-inventoried retailers. The logic of our methodology is as follows. If AIT is predictive of sales or earnings, AND if equity analysts fail to make sufficient adjustments for changes in inventory levels, their sales and earnings forecasts will be overly optimistic for "over-inventoried," and overly pessimistic for "under-inventoried," retailers. Hence, we employ this method with the caveat that it tests not only whether AIT is predictive of future performance, but also for equity analysts' failure to adjust sufficiently for AIT's predictive power.
We identify over-and under-inventoried retailers by their AIT rankings. We classify as under- ) across all retailers being 5%, over-estimating sales by 0.8% is equivalent to over-estimating sales growth by 16% for the average retailer. Sales of retailers that are under-inventoried tend to be underestimated by roughly 1.2%, which translates into under-estimating the growth rate for the average retailer by 24%. Although it declines over time, this bias persists, with analysts continuing to over-estimate sales for retailers that were over-inventoried, and under-estimate sales for retailers that were under-inventoried, for several months after the release of previous year's financial statements. Figure 3b plots for the same period the bias in analysts' earnings forecasts, which, like their sales forecasts, tend to be overly optimistic for retailers that were over-inventoried, and overly pessimistic for retailers that were under-inventoried, the previous year. A month after the release of financial statement of previous fiscal year analysts over-estimated earnings for over-inventoried retailers by 10 cents per share; this bias persists several months into the fiscal year, with analysts over-estimating earnings for over-inventoried retailers by 4 cents per share after six months into the fiscal year. For under-inventoried retailers, analysts under-forecast earnings by 6 cents per share one month after the release of financial statements for the previous fiscal year. Given that the average change in annual EPS for retailers is only 10 cents per share, overestimates of 6 cents per share for under-inventoried and 12 cents per share for over-inventoried retailers are economically salient.
Does AIT predict changes in stock price? Again, the answer is, in a single word, yes. We test if a portfolio based on AIT performs better than retail stocks in general. We form investment portfolios based on July 31 st of each year using financial statements for fiscal year end dates by January 31 st . Providing a minimum six-month lag between fiscal year end dates and the date of formation of portfolios is a standard practice that allows information contained in financial statements, which are typically filed with the SEC within one to three months after the fiscal year end date, to disseminate into the market. The AIT method of portfolio formation is conservative in also not using any metrics that might have been available before July 31 st , such as earnings announcements for the first quarter of the current fiscal year.
Our methodology ranks retailers within each segment based on the adjusted inventory turns derived from their financial statements. On the basis of these AIT rankings, the retailers are then classified into five portfolios, from those in the lowest 20% to those in the highest 20%. For example, in the apparel and footwear segment in 2010, 43 retailers were classified into five portfolios based on their AIT, as can be seen in Table 2 below.
(Insert Table 2 here)
The lowest portfolio (which consists of retailers with the lowest AIT) had an annual excess return of 2.28%, the highest portfolio an annual excess return of 14.88%. The 12.6% per year difference between the two portfolios is statistically significant and managerially substantial. To understand the impact of such a difference, consider that a $100 investment over 10 years would, with an annual return of 2.28%, amount to $125, and with an annual return of 14.88%, amount to $400.
Addressing the Retailer's Choice
What can retailers do to manage investors' and lenders', as well as their own, concerns about inventory?
One, they should benchmark their adjusted inventory turns over time and against those of other retailers.
As we have argued and shown above, this metric is a leading indicator of sales, earnings, and stock price.
Two, they should be wary of significant changes in their inventory turns. Like it or not, many investors and lenders continue to rely on this metric, despite its weaknesses. Hence, retailers should manage the potential signals that might be communicated by changes in inventory turns.
Because improving AIT is equivalent to improving inventory productivity, retailers stand to benefit significantly from carefully tracking their adjusted inventory turns and taking appropriate actions.
AIT is improved by having the right product in the right place at the right time. As we vii and others have argued elsewhere, retailers have at their disposal multiple levers for improving inventory productivity.
These can be broadly categorized as levers for improving forecasting, responsiveness, and planning.
Retailers that improve their forecasting ability are better able to match supply with demand; more accurate forecasts that reduce the need for safety stock translate into improvements in inventory productivity. Forecast accuracy can be improved via a mix of technology and processes. Better forecasts are possible owing to the availability of large volumes of data viii and superior analytical technologies.
Moreover, our past research has shown accuracy to improve dramatically when forecasts are based at least in part on early sales data ix . Dramatic improvements in inventory productivity have accrued to companies that have invested in capabilities that enable them to read early signals from the market and respond quickly with additional supplies (e.g., Zara x ) or well-planned price changes xi or other means of stimulating demand. Inventory planning is complicated by the numbers of stock-keeping units (SKUs) and stores that comprise a typical retail chain today. Even a medium-sized retailer will have tens of thousands of SKUs in each of hundreds of stores, yielding more than a million store-SKU inventory locations for which inventory needs to be planned. Recent advances in information technology are nevertheless enabling retailers to substantially improve their planning approaches, and, in some cases, demonstrably improve gross margin and inventory turns concurrently.
A focus on managing AIT needs to be supplemented with attention to inventory turns. Problems with using inventory turns as a metric notwithstanding, many investors, as we point out above, still regard it in the manner of a canary in a coal mine. Observed highly-respected investor Peter Lynch xii : "When I research a stock, I always check to see if inventories are piling up. . . . With a manufacturer or a retailer, an inventory buildup is usually a bad sign. When inventories grow faster than sales, it is a red flag."
Inventory growing faster than sales, Peter Lynch's "red flag," is mathematically equivalent to tracking inventory turns.
Retailers might have compelling reasons to slow their inventory turns, that is, to increase inventory at a faster rate than sales growth. But to allay investor concerns, such compelling reasons need to be communicated, ideally before inventory is increased. Consider the following example shared with us by a manager at a leading retailer with more than $1 billion in annual sales. "We were planning to announce new merchandise categories coming to our stores, and a significant SKU expansion," the manager explained. The expanded assortment would, according to the manager, require "a significant inventory investment and a decline in turns for period of time." The company was convinced that increasing inventory and reducing inventory turns was the right call. Observed the manager: "We were making a substantial planned investment in inventory to drive sales, broaden our assortment, and become more relevant to our customer. We needed higher inventory levels to drive higher sales per square foot. . .
While inventories were going to be up a material amount by the end of the year, it was a fully planned and thought-through strategy by our teams."
The manager advocated communicating the planned increase in inventory levels to investors at the upcoming earnings call. Other managers, although initially hesitant, came to view this as a worthwhile step, and in the subsequent earnings call, according to the manager, it was "loudly stated [that] inventory explanation before inventory was increased seemed to allay investor concern; "questions about inventory," the manager observed, "have been at an absolute minimum from investors." This retailer's experience illustrates the benefits and importance of managing investor perceptions of inventory levels. Retailers should, of course, make choices about what and how much to inventory with an eye towards long-term performance. AIT is a useful metric in this regard. But retailers also, recognizing that many investors still attend closely to inventory turns, need to ensure that any changes therein are explained to, before they are observed by, investors.
Conclusion
Although the costs associated with carrying inventory, especially inventory that becomes obsolete, can be substantial, inventory is vital to sales, absence of the right inventory at the right location often translating into lost sales. Moreover, investors and lenders, as we have pointed out, should and do view inventory levels as an indicator of future earnings, sales, and stock price. To get inventory levels "right" is thus a challenging task for retailers. This paper offers retailers guidance in balancing the different perspectives that are brought to bear on inventory, and, perhaps most important, develops a metric, which we term Adjusted Inventory Turns, that, when used to establish appropriate inventory levels, constitutes a superior indicator of sales, earnings, and stock price.
Appendix: Computation of Adjusted Inventory Turnover
The research presented in this paper builds on prior research xiii that the three of us have conducted either together or with other co-authors. We have simplified the research methodology and constructed a new benchmarking metric that can be easily used in practice. The methods used in our prior research are technically more sophisticated but also a little harder to understand and explain. Readers interested in exploring technical and methodological details and more sophisticated econometric models should look at the papers cited. Using these data, we construct the following metrics. In each formula, the index i denotes the firm and t denotes the year. Inventory Turnover (IT) is defined as the ratio of cost of goods sold to ending inventory. We adjust both CGS and INV for LIFO reserves by subtracting change in LIFO reserves from CGS and adding LIFO reserve to INV in order to do an apples-to-apples comparison across retailers with different ways of accounting for inventory. Ceteris paribus, the higher the value of IT, the more efficient is a retailer at managing its inventory. One may replace ending inventory with the average of quarterly inventories of the firm during the year, but one must consistently use the same definition throughout.
Gross Margin (GM) is defined as the ratio of gross profit to sales revenue. In this computation, cost of goods sold is adjusted for change in LIFO reserves.
Capital Intensity (CI) is defined as the ratio of capital assets to total assets + capitalized leases, where capital assets is measured as gross property, plant and equipment + capitalized leases. It measures the fraction of a retailer's assets invested in its stores, supply chain infrastructure, information technology, and other capital assets. The higher this ratio, the more capital intensive a retailer is. In computing this ratio, we capitalize operational leases and add them to both PPEG and TA.
it it it it it PPEG CapitalizedLeases CI TA CapitalizedLeases
Here, capitalized leases are computed as described above.
In each year, we regress log IT it on log (1-GM it ) and log CI it using segment-wise intercepts.
Here, s(i) denotes the SIC segment of firm i, b 1t denotes the coefficient of log (1-GM it ) in year t and b 2t denotes the coefficient of log CI it in year t. We use (1-GM it ) instead of GM it because (1-GM it ) is always a positive number, which implies that we can take logarithms without having to exclude any observations. Intuitively, AIT may be thought of as the effective inventory turnover that is obtained after adjusting the raw inventory turnover for concomitant changes in gross margin and capital intensity. Hence, AIT can be used to benchmark inventory turnover performance because it is unaffected by changes in gross margin and capital intensity.
As noted earlier in this appendix, this paper builds on the authors' prior research, where we present more theoretical analyses of the usefulness of inventory data and its correlation with other metrics. Gaur, Fisher and Raman xiv test hypotheses regarding the correlation of inventory turnover with gross margin, capital intensity and sales surprise using a panel data model. The AIT metric in that paper is a little more sophisticated than the one we have presented in this paper. Kesavan, Gaur and Raman xv construct a more sophisticated simultaneous equations model that expresses inventory, sales and gross margin as functions of each other and other independent covariates. They use their model to develop a modified metric Abnormal Inventory Growth (AIG) and to generate sales forecasts. These forecasts are shown to be more accurate than those from sell-side equity analysts. Note: Time periods 1, 2, and 3 refer, respectively, to 1, 4, and 7 months after the release of previous fiscal year's financial statements. OI and UI refer to over-inventoried and under-inventoried retailers.
